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Where now after ten years of Eastern enlargement?  
László Andor 
EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
Abstract 
The aim of this article is to evaluate the situation of the Central and Eastern European countries 
within the EU on the 10th anniversary of the Eastern Enlargement. Since 2004, the region has shown a 
trend to catch up with Western Europe in terms of both employment and economic performance. 
However, the financial and economic crisis which started in 2008 disrupted the previous trends of 
convergence for some, and greater differences emerged between individual countries' performances. 
The eastward enlargement has practically doubled labour mobility within the EU, and this 
phenomenon is likely to be sustained as long as income disparities between Member States persist. 
The 2004 and 2007 enlargements brought more welfare to the countries receiving mobile workers, 
whereas countries of origin bear the real risks of labour mobility from east to west. Today, it can be 
said that most of the newer Member States, irrespective of the varying speeds of convergence have 
developed within the EU as an 'inner periphery'. In order to make better use of the potential for 
economic growth in Central-Eastern Europe, investing in human capital should become a priority. The 
major question for the second decade of our enlarged European Union - aside from the reform of the 
monetary union - is whether the EU’s eastern region can continue to catch up without the internal 
socio-economic polarisation observed thus far, and whether the latter process can in fact be reversed. 
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The 'Eastern enlargement' in May 2004 opened the EU's doors to ten countries. Of these, the four 
Visegrád states, the three Baltic countries and a former Yugoslav state had at that time completed 
their 15-year transition towards a market economy. In the first half of the 1990s these countries' 
income, measured in terms of GDP, had fallen by 20 to 30 percent. Poland was the first country to 
return to the same income levels as before the transition, Hungary was next in 2000, and the other 
countries followed later. 
The experience of the 'great transformation' which began in Central-Eastern Europe a quarter of a 
century ago played a key role in determining what the citizens of the new Member States expected 
from their accession to the EU: stable and sustainable growth. If we look at the decade since 2004, 
the region really seems to have been catching up with Western Europe in terms of both employment 
and economic performance. 
However, the financial and economic crisis which started in 2008 disrupted the previous trend of 
convergence to some extent. Greater differences between individual countries' performances also 
emerged. Poland and Slovakia, for example, generally continued to catch up, while Hungary fell 
behind on many growth, employment and social indicators.  
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The Community which originally (1957) comprised six Member States had already taken in nine 
additional countries prior to this enlargement. But the 2004 enlargement was different, as in this 
case the income disparity between new and old Member States was very significant. As a result, 
capital flows largely from west to east in the enlarged union, while the workers go from east to west. 
Although the destination countries in Western Europe benefit a great deal from mobile Central-
Eastern European workers in economic terms, these countries are also witnessing a kind of "welfare 
chauvinism", turning public opinion against EU migrants. Some people find it hard to accept that the 
EU's enlargement to the east has brought with it not only countries and markets but also people, and 
these people have the same rights. In fact, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements brought more welfare to 
the receiving countries: a higher proportion of mobile citizens from Central-Eastern Europe are of 
working age, and more often employed, compared with nationals of the destination countries, and 
so they are actually net contributors to their social security systems.  
Source: Eurostat EU-LFS
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The real risks of labour mobility from east to west are not in the recipient countries but in the 
migrants' countries of origin. A large percentage of workers who migrate from Central-Eastern 
Europe to the West are overqualified for the jobs in which they find themselves. In 2012 this was the 
case for about half of Central-Eastern European migrants who had completed higher education. This 
rate of over-qualification is more than twice as high as for the nationals of the receiving countries. In 
certain sectors of employment, particularly health care, we can speak of a 'brain drain' which leads to 
serious problems in the highly skilled workers' countries of origin. 
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Mobile EU workers' high over-qualification rate
Over-qualification rate among 
recently established foreigners 
by group of nationality 
(as a percentage of all highly 
educated persons
in employment)
Source: Eurostat, LFS and European 
Commission calculations
 
At the same time personal remittances paid by expatriates to their home countries have reached 
significant magnitudes - beyond 3% of GDP in Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania. In the short term, 
these inflows are important for the prosperity and for the balance of payments of the home 
countries. However, in the longer term, it is questionable whether remittances can be sustained at 
sufficiently high levels to actually offset the negative consequences of workers’ outflow from Central-
Eastern Europe and the increasing dependency ratio between the employed and non-employed 
population in these countries. If labour mobility is at all a threat to social security systems, it is mainly 
in the countries of origin. 
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP), average 2004-12
Source: World Bank 
Remittances paid by workers from Central 
and Eastern European to their home countries
 
Fortunately, mobile workers also sometimes return. They bring valuable new skills and experience 
that benefit the economies of their countries – as shown by the example of Poland where some 
130.000 people returned in 2012 according to the migration statistics, contributing to the country’s 
recent above-average growth performance. Generally, most people entering Central-Eastern 
European Member States are actually returning nationals. 
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'Immigration of nationals' ('000 and as a percentage of all migration 
inflows), 2012
Source: Eurostat,migration statistics
 
The eastward enlargement which took place in 2004 and 2007 has de facto doubled the mobility of 
labour within the EU. This mobility is likely to be sustained as long as income disparities between 
Member States persist. However, this should not be seen as an automatic link that is independent of 
all other factors. For example, there is also a large income disparity between the Czech Republic and 
its neighbour Germany, and yet very few Czechs migrate. This is obviously partly due to the fact that 
in the Czech Republic the at-risk-of-poverty rate (10%) is even below the one in Germany (16%), 
despite much lower per-capita GDP. 
In several of the new Member States the issue of finding a way out of poverty is linked to the 
situation of the Roma population. While there is also a sizeable Roma minority in some of the older 
Member States, for example Spain, Roma integration has really become an issue in the EU only since 
the 2004 enlargement. Not all Roma are poor, but in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia the Roma minority and the rest of the population are a world apart in terms of 
education, employment, health and housing conditions. As a result of constant prejudice and the 
open racism that in some cases has political support, it is difficult to overcome this disparity and 
often even to determine its extent. 
Other features also distinguish Central-Eastern Europe from older EU Member States, for example 
working conditions. There are major differences between east and west with regard to the degree of 
organisation of employers and employees. According to the OECD, less than a fifth of wage and 
salary earners in Poland or the Czech Republic are actually members of trade unions – compared 
with a share of almost 70% in the Scandinavian Member States. This in turn means that in terms of 
economic policy there is a constant temptation to improve competitiveness at the expense of 
workers. Modernisation of vocational education and building innovation capacity has very few 
drivers; in some cases it is transnational investment that turns out to be the stimulating factor. 
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Taking into account the various qualitative aspects of integration, one can argue that the newer 
Member States have developed within the EU as an 'inner periphery', regardless of their respective 
GDP growth rates, and the resulting trends of convergence. The region’s booming capital cities 
developed good appearance, which however only reinforces the challenge in terms of economic, 
social and territorial cohesion within these countries. 
In order to make better use of the potential for economic growth in Central-Eastern Europe, a first 
necessary step would be for the governments to rethink their role in the development of human 
capital and place greater emphasis on investing in it. As the coming decades must combine better 
living standards for all with higher productivity growth, new investments are necessary in education, 
health and social inclusion, where cutbacks and disinvestment too often dominated the agenda. 
Greater social investment is not only a responsibility of the public sector but is also in the best 
interest of companies. However, survey data confirm that businesses in Central-Eastern Europe tend 
to attribute lower priority to human capital issues than their Western European peers. This is 
especially true for businesses in Romania and Bulgaria. Poland also stands out: on the one hand, 
Polish business seems to be more optimistic than in Western countries when it comes to the 
availability of skilled, educated, competent and experienced human resources. On the other hand, 
investments in human capital formation (apprenticeships, attracting talents, training, workers' 
motivation) tend to be seen as a lower priority in Poland compared to the EU average. Such an 
attitude may be explained by the strength of the cohorts entering the Polish labour market in recent 
years, but cannot be sustained when the workforce begins to age and shrink as in the rest of Europe. 
6 
 
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2013, International Institute for Management Development 
Business survey results from IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2013
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The great human capital challenge in Central-Eastern Europe is also well illustrated by data on 
workers’ participation in lifelong learning. With the exceptions of Slovenia and Estonia, Central-
Eastern Member States tend to have a far lower percentage of workers or unemployed people who 
participate in training and education compared to ‘older’ Member States.  According to the Labour 
Force Survey, in Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria the share is only around 5%. 
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Source: EU-LFS
Participation rate in education and training (last 4 weeks), 2013
(selected countries)
0
5
10
15
20
25
 
The necessity to step up investment in human capital should be reflected by the way Central-Eastern 
European countries make use of resources available from EU Structural and Investment Funds. The 
European Social Fund, for example, could play a much greater role than previously in helping to 
promote the employment of women, young professionals starting their career (by introducing the 
Youth Guarantee), Roma integration, labour market integration for people with disabilities and active 
ageing. It can also make a major contribution to improving the quality of education systems. The EU 
has established a rule for 2014-20 that a certain minimum share of each country’s allocation from 
the Structural Funds has to be dedicated to human capital investment through the European Social 
Fund. However, more effective financing of these programmes depends primarily on the political will 
in the individual countries. 
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that economic and social development programmes (where they 
exist) should be reconciled not only with the use of EU funds but also with the plans for monetary 
reform. The euro was successfully introduced over the past decade in four Central-Eastern European 
countries (Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia and Latvia), and a fifth one (Lithuania) is no preparing to follow 
suit. Significantly, these are all among the smaller countries in the region. However, there was a price 
to be paid for this monetary success: in Latvia, for example, greater social inequality, and in Slovakia 
greater geographical inequality. 
Capacity for financial convergence is a virtue, but at the same time aggressive "internal devaluation", 
i.e. the reduction of wages and government expenditure, which pushes up unemployment, poverty 
and out-migration, can undermine the potential for economic growth.  
For example, over the period 2008 to 2013, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have all seen 
their unemployment rates increase by 2 to 3 percentage points. That said, these shifts in 
unemployment were below EU average (+3.8 percentage points), and certainly more modest than 
under the ‘Baltic model’ where priority was attached to maintaining the currencies’ peg with the 
euro. In addition, over the same period in countries which kept their own currencies, pressure on 
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wages had led to a noticeable decline in the real compensation per employee only in Hungary. In 
other words, external devaluation through the exchange rate has reduced the pressure on these 
countries to pursue internal devaluation. From the point of view of unemployment and wages, the 
crisis may have led to more detrimental labour market outcomes had these countries striven to 
maintain their pre-crisis exchange rate.  
Source: ECB
Index: 2008, 1st quarter = 100
Bilateral exchange rates to the EURO, quarterly 
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However, while currency devaluations reduce the pressure on labour markets during a downturn, 
they can hardly be seen a sustainable compensation for lacking competitiveness in the long run.  
Likewise, internal devaluation at the expense of the economy's human capital is socially 
unacceptable and represents an equally poor substitute for reforms and investments that genuinely 
strengthen productivity and competitiveness. 
The point is again that Central-European countries need to invest in human capital in order to be able 
to reap the benefits of joining the euro zone. However, the problem of economic adjustment within 
the monetary union is European by nature, so that satisfactory answers must be found at European 
level: Member States confronted with economic shocks should not be left alone and condemned to 
internal devaluation in an effort to restore competitiveness and growth. 
The major question for the second decade of our enlarged Union - aside from the reform of the 
monetary union - is whether the EU’s eastern region can continue to catch up without the internal 
socio-economic polarisation observed thus far, and whether the latter process can in fact be 
reversed. Whether EU membership has been positive for the new Member States is something that 
cannot be measured only in terms of gross domestic product. The quality of economic development 
and the changes in society are at least as important, if not more important. 
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If the ‘new Member States’ wish to create a new development path for themselves that has the 
qualities of being smart, sustainable and inclusive, they also have to promote stronger (and genuine) 
social dialogue. A wider and better organised social economy sector can also contribute to a model 
that offers a higher level of economic resilience and social cohesion at the same time. 
The European Union's endeavour for a more successful, globally competitive social market economy 
may bring significant benefits for Central-Eastern Europe. This is not the only region in Europe that 
needs to learn from existing good practices and continue reforming accordingly, but one where 
reconciling quantitative convergence with qualitative modernisation turns out to be a challenge 
again and again. 
The EU's economic governance cycle and policy recommendations, together with the existing 
budgetary instruments provide orientation as well as support for such an effort. The question is 
whether the necessary social and political will exists within the newer Member States themselves. 
 
 
This text is an adapted version of an article published recently in the Hungarian daily newspaper 
Népszabadság and the UK based online Social Europe Journal. 
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Annex: Additional information in tables 
 
Real GDP growth, % change on previous year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CZ 4.2 3.1 2.1 3.8 4.7 6.8 7 5.7 3.1 -4.5 2.5 1.8 -1 -0.9
EE 9.7 6.3 6.6 7.8 6.3 8.9 10.1 7.5 -4.2 -14.1 2.6 9.6 3.9 0.8
HU 4.2 3.7 4.5 3.9 4.8 4 3.9 0.1 0.9 -6.8 1.1 1.6 -1.7 1.1
LV 3.6 6.7 6.8 10.3 7.4 7.8 7.8 9.8 2.9 -14.8 1.6 6 3.7 3.3
LT 5.7 7.3 7.1 7.7 8.8 10.1 11 10 -2.8 -17.7 -1.3 5.3 5.2 4.1
PL 4.3 1.2 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.8 5.1 1.6 3.9 4.5 2 1.6
SI 4.3 2.9 3.8 2.9 4.4 4 5.8 7 3.4 -7.9 1.3 0.7 -2.5 -1.1
SK 1.4 3.5 4.6 4.8 5.1 6.7 8.3 10.5 5.8 -4.9 4.4 3 1.8 0.9
BG 5.7 4.2 4.7 5.5 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.2 -5.5 0.4 1.8 0.6 0.9
RO 2.4 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.5 4.2 7.9 6.3 7.3 -6.6 -1.1 2.3 0.6 3.5
EU15 3.9 2 1.2 1.3 2.4 2 3.2 3 0.1 -4.6 2 1.5 -0.5 0
EU28 3.9 2 1.3 1.5 2.6 2.2 3.4 3.2 0.4 -4.5 2 1.6 -0.4 0.1
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts  
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GDP (PPS) per capita, EU28=100
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CZ 73 74 77 78 79 80 83 81 83 81 81 81
EE 47 50 55 58 62 66 70 69 64 64 69 71
HU 58 61 63 63 63 63 62 64 65 66 67 67
LV 42 45 50 52 55 58 62 64 58 62 68 72
LT 39 41 44 47 50 53 57 59 54 55 60 64
PL 48 48 49 51 51 52 55 56 61 63 65 67
SI 80 83 84 87 87 88 89 91 86 84 84 84
SK 53 54 56 57 60 63 68 73 73 74 75 76
BG 30 32 34 35 37 38 40 44 44 44 47 47
RO 28 29 31 34 35 38 42 47 47 48 48 50
EU15
EU28
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts  
 
Employment growth, % change on previous year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CZ -0.8 -0.3 0.6 -0.8 -0.3 2.1 1.3 2.1 2.3 -1.8 -1 0 0.4 0.9
EE -1.5 0.8 1.4 1.4 0 2 5.4 0.8 0.2 -10 -4.8 7 2.2
HU 1 -0.2 -0.1 0 -1 -0.3 0.4 0.7 -1.8 -2.5 0.8 0.3 0 0.4
LV -3.8 3.6 2.2 0 2.5 1.8 2.8 -0.7 -6.8 -11.9 0.5 1.8
LT 1.2 2.9 1.9 1.2 1.6 4.9 -1.4 -0.8 -14.3 -6.7 1.5 1.4 2.3
PL 2.2 3.2 4.5 3.8 0.4 -2.7 0.6 0.1
SI 1.5 0.6 1.6 -0.3 0.4 -0.5 1.6 3.3 2.6 -1.8 -2.2 -1.6 -0.8 -2
SK -2 0.6 0.1 1.1 -0.2 1.6 2.1 2.1 3.2 -2 -1.5 1.8 0.1
BG -2.4 -0.8 0.2 3 2.6 2.7 3.3 3.2 2.4 -1.7 -3.9 -2.2 -2.5
RO -0.8 -1.1 -10.2 0 -1.7 -1.5 0.7 0.4 0 -2 -0.3 -0.8 1.3 -0.1
EU15 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.8 1 1.5 1.6 0.8 -1.8 -0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.4
EU28 0.8 -0.1 0.4 0.7 1 1.6 1.8 1 -1.8 -0.7 0.2 -0.2 -0.4
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts  
 
Employment rate, % of population 20-64
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CZ 71 71.2 71.6 70.7 70.1 70.7 71.2 72 72.4 70.9 70.4 70.9 71.5 72.5
EE 67.4 67.8 69.2 70 70.6 72 75.8 76.8 77 69.9 66.7 70.4 72.1 73.3
HU 61.2 61.3 61.4 62.4 62.1 62.2 62.6 62.6 61.9 60.5 60.4 60.7 62.1 63.2
LV 65.6 64.2 67.2 68.9 69 70.6 71.6 72.7 72 67 64.3 66.9 68.5 69.9
LT 63.5 65.1 67 68.9 69.3 70.3 73.5 75.2 75.8 67.1 65 66.3 68.1 69.7
PL 61 59.4 57.4 57.1 57.3 58.3 60.1 62.7 65 64.9 64.3 64.5 64.7 64.9
SI 68.5 69.4 69 68.1 70.4 71.1 71.5 72.4 73 71.9 70.3 68.4 68.3 67.2
SK 63.5 63.5 63.6 64.8 63.7 64.5 66 67.2 68.8 66.4 64.6 65 65.1 65
BG 55.3 54.8 55.8 58 60.1 61.9 65.1 68.4 70.7 68.8 65.4 62.9 63 63.5
RO 69.1 68.3 63.3 63.7 63.5 63.6 64.8 64.4 64.4 63.5 63.3 62.8 63.8 63.9
EU15 67.3 67.9 68.1 68.4 68.9 69.4 70.2 71 71.3 69.9 69.6 69.7 69.4 69.2
EU28 66.6 67 67.4 67.9 68.9 69.8 70.3 68.9 68.5 68.5 68.4 68.3
Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS  
 
12 
 
Unemployment rate, % of active population 15+
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CZ 8.8 8.1 7.3 7.8 8.3 7.9 7.1 5.3 4.4 6.7 7.3 6.7 7 7
EE 14.6 13 11.2 10.3 10.1 8 5.9 4.6 5.5 13.5 16.7 12.3 10 8.6
HU 6.3 5.6 5.6 5.8 6.1 7.2 7.5 7.4 7.8 10 11.2 10.9 10.9 10.2
LV 16.4 17.4 13.9 12.6 11.6 8.5 5.8 4.3 5.8 13.8 17.8 15.4 13.4 11.8
LT 14.3 13.5 12.5 11.6 11.7 10 7 6.1 7.7 17.5 19.5 16.2 15 11.9
PL 16.1 18.3 20 19.8 19.1 17.9 13.9 9.6 7.1 8.1 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.3
SI 6.7 6.2 6.3 6.7 6.3 6.5 6 4.9 4.4 5.9 7.3 8.2 8.9 10.1
SK 18.9 19.5 18.8 17.7 18.4 16.4 13.5 11.2 9.6 12.1 14.5 13.7 14 14.2
BG 16.4 19.5 18.2 13.7 12.1 10.1 9 6.9 5.6 6.8 10.3 11.3 12.3 13
RO 6.8 6.6 7.5 6.8 8 7.2 7.3 6.4 5.8 6.9 7.3 7.4 7 7.3
EU15 7.9 7.3 7.7 8.1 8.3 8.2 7.8 7.1 7.2 9.1 9.5 9.6 10.6 11
EU28 8.9 8.6 9 9.1 9.3 9 8.2 7.2 7 9 9.6 9.6 10.4 10.8
Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS  
 
At-risk-of-poverty-and-social-exclusion rate, % of total population
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CZ 19.6 18 15.8 15.3 14 14.4 15.3 15.4
EE 26.3 25.9 22 22 21.8 23.4 21.7 23.1 23.4
HU 32.1 31.4 29.4 28.2 29.6 29.9 31 32.4 33.5
LV 46.3 42.2 35.1 34.2 37.9 38.2 40.1 36.2 35.1
LT 41 35.9 28.7 27.6 29.6 34 33.1 32.5
PL 45.3 39.5 34.4 30.5 27.8 27.8 27.2 26.7
SI 18.5 17.1 17.1 18.5 17.1 18.3 19.3 19.6
SK 32 26.7 21.3 20.6 19.6 20.6 20.6 20.5
BG 61.3 60.7 44.8 46.2 49.2 49.1 49.3
RO 45.9 44.2 43.1 41.4 40.3 41.7
EU15 21.6 21.9 21.6 21.6 21.3 21.8 22.6 23.1
EU28 23.7 24.3 24.8
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC  
 
S80/S20 income quintile share ratio
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CZ 3.4 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
EE 6.3 6.1 6.1 5.9 7.2 5.9 5.5 5.5 5 5 5 5.3 5.4
HU 3.3 3.1 3 3.3 4 5.5 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.9 4 4.2
LV 5 4.9 6.9 6.3 5.9 5.9 6.4 7.3 5.8 5.3
LT 5.5 6.7 7.8 6.4 7.3 7.4 6.8 6.5 6.5 6.3
PL 4.7 4.7 6.6 5.6 5.3 5.1 5 5 5 4.9
SI 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.4
SK 3.9 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.7
BG 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.6 4 3.7 5.1 7 6.5 5.9 5.9 6.5 6.1
RO 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.3 7.8 7 6.7 6 6.2 6.3
EU15 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.9 4.9 5 5.1 5.1
EU28 5 5.1 5.1
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC; income relates to one year before reference year  
 
 
 
 
